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When economists have studied incentives in 
organizations, the main focus has been on using 
monetary payments in exchange for perfor-
mance in specific measurable dimensions. But 
organizations use a wide variety of means to 
motivate their workers. One such method, which 
has not been studied much to date, is the explicit 
creation of status rewards attached to good per-
formance. Under such schemes, an agent is 
given a positional good—such as a job title or 
a medal—whose value comes from its scarcity. 
Some organizations, such as the military, make 
extensive use of medals as status rewards rather 
than making cash payments. Academia, too, is 
awash with job titles, fellowships, and prizes 
whose value is mostly symbolic, but which con-
vey status on their recipients.
In this paper, we consider the role of such 
status awards as an incentive device. We allow 
a principal to reward an agent for good perfor-
mance in conventional terms (i.e., with money) 
and/or by giving him a positional good. We sup-
pose that the latter has a zero marginal cost. 
(We have in mind rewards like “employee of the 
month” or “full professor” or “vice president.”) 
To the extent that the positional good is valued, 
the organization is exploiting a preference for 
status to motivate agents. However, the extent of 
the status conveyed depends on how scarce the 
reward is and requires a well-defined rule that 
rewards only the deserving.
The paper studies a model with moral hazard 
and limited liability which limits the ability of 
an organization to achieve its desired effort level 
using monetary incentives. In addition to the 
  Exceptions include Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela, and 
Xianwen Shi (2007), Bruno Frey (2007), and Emmanuelle 
Auriol and Régis Renault (forthcoming).
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standard problems that stem from this, we add the 
possibility that desired output is hard to measure. 
Specifically, even if the final output is observable, 
we assume that it is not verifiable. The principal 
needs to condition rewards on an imperfect, but 
contractible, signal of achievement. Even if the 
principal can observe the true output, it will not 
be ex post incentive compatible for him to pay 
a reward to an agent who has produced it.2 The 
fact that status incentives are costless means that 
they are ex post incentive compatible in such cir-
cumstances. By the same token, status incentives 
also increase effort while reducing the optimal 
level of monetary incentives.
The economic implications of the idea that 
human beings have a craving for status has been 
widely studied (see, for example, Robert H. 
Frank 985). A key component of the quest for 
status comes from the fact that humans make 
social comparisons when assessing the value of 
what they receive, something that has recently 
been found in brain activity (see K. Fleissbach 
et al. 2007) and in studies of subjective happi-
ness (see Richard Layard 2005). This paper is 
also linked to the literature on how concerns 
about fairness and inequality affect wage struc-
tures within firms. Recent empirical evidence 
by Gordon D. A. Brown et al. (forthcoming) 
suggests that an individual’s rank in the wage 
distribution affects job satisfaction even when 
monetary wage differentials are controlled for. 
Our paper is also related to the work of Ernst 
Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (999) who empha-
size the role of relative rewards within organi-
zations due to perceptions of fairness and their 
implications for the design of incentives.
This paper is part of a wider project that 
considers how organizations foster effort using 
means other than  the promise of money (or pri-
vate goods). The use of status is a way of creating 
“motivated agents” in the sense of Besley and 
2 This clearly depends on the fact that we have a static 
model. For example, we do not consider the use of relational 
incentive contracts along the lines of George P. Baker, 
Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy (2002).
* Besley: London School of Economics, Houghton Street, 
London WC2A 2AE, UK (e-mail: t.besley@lse.ac.uk); 
Ghatak: London School of Economics, Houghton Street, 
London WC2A 2AE, UK (e-mail: m.ghatak@lse.ac.uk). 
We thank our discussant, Bob Gibbons, Oliver Denk, 
and the participants in the session for useful comments. 
The authors are grateful to the Microsoft Corporation for 
support.
VOL. 98 NO. 2 207StAtuS INcENtIVES
Ghatak (2005). It is also related to recent work 
by George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2005) 
who discuss the importance of creating identi-
ties to improve organizational performance.
I.  The Benchmark Model
A principal employs a continuum of agents of 
size one, each of whom works independently on 
a project whose success depends on effort and 
is uncorrelated across the agents. The project 
yields an output p0 in all states of the world. In 
addition, it generates p . 0 for the principal if 
is successful. The agent’s effort e determines 
the probability of success. We assume e [ 30, 4 
and the cost of effort is c/2 e2. The agent has an 
outside option of u which we set at zero. We 
assume also that the agent has no wealth, i.e., 
there is limited liability.
Following Baker (992), we assume that 
the stochastic part of the principal’s payoff is 
observable but not verifiable. However, there is 
a contractible signal s [ 50,  6 on which con-
tracts can be conditioned. It is important to note 
that, even though the principal’s payoff may 
be observable, the fact that it is not verifiable 
means that there is no ex post incentive-com-
patible means of rewarding the agent when he 
produces p. This is because the principal would 
always have an incentive to lie after p is real-
ized in the event that s 5 0 and the output is 
p. This weakens the ability of the principal to 
create incentives for the agent to overcome the 
moral hazard problem.
Let g 12 denote the probability that the sig-
nal is s 5  when the project is successful and 
let g 102 denote the probability that the sig-
nal is s 5  when the project is a failure. We 
assume that the signal is (weakly) informative 
in the sense that g 12 $ g 102 . If g 12 5  and 
g 102 5 0, then output is perfectly observed.
All agents are identical, so we can study the 
determination of incentives for a representative 
agent. As a benchmark, consider the first best 
where effort is chosen to maximize the joint 
surplus of the principal and agent. This yields 
effort level
 e* 5 arg max
e
 eep 2 c2  e2f 5 pc .
 It would be straightforward, although taxanomic, to 
extend the model to the case where the participation con-
straint binds.
We assume p/c ,  to focus on interior solutions.
A contract is a pair 5b 1s2 6s[50, 6 . It is 
straightforward to solve for the optimal incen-
tive scheme. Let D 5 g 12 2 g 102 . First, observe 
that the optimal effort level of the agent is
 eˆ 5 arg max
e
 5eD 3b 12 2 b 102 4
 1 3g 102 3b 12 2 b 102 4	 1 b 102 2 c2  e24 6	 5 D 3b 11 2 2 b 10 2 4c .
Plugging this into the principal’s payoff func-
tion, she chooses the contract to maximize
 
D 3b 11 2 2 b 10 2 4
c  3p 2 D 3b 12 2 b 102 4 4	 	 	 2 g 102b 12 2 1 2 g 102 2b 102 .
This yields:
PROPOSITIOn . the optimal contract sets 
b 10 2 5 0 and
 b 12 5 max e0, pD 2 g 10 2c2D2 f .
the corresponding effort level is
 e 5 max e0, b 11 2Dc f .
This result is intuitive. It is optimal to reduce 
b 102 down to the minimum possible level (given 
limited liability), i.e., 0, as extra effort can be 
elicited while reducing the principal’s cost. The 
interesting issue is whether it is worthwhile to 
offer a bonus when the verifiable signal s 5  
is observed. Here, Proposition  says that, if the 
output is sufficiently well measured, there is pos-
itive incentive pay to elicit effort. Specifically, 
this will be the case if
 
p
c  $ 
g 10 2
D
,
which is more likely to be satisfied the higher is 
g 12 and the lower is g 102 . In particular, it will 
always hold when g 102 is close enough to zero. 
If this condition does not hold, it is not worth-
while for the principal to use any incentive pay 
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at all. This is basically the main finding of Baker 
(992) applied to this framework.
II.  Introducing Status Incentives
We now allow the principal to introduce a 
purely nominal reward—a pure positional good 
to the agent in the event that he produces high 
output for the principal. As discussed above, 
this could be a job title change (promotion from 
associate to full professor), granting some agents 
interior offices rather than open-plan desks, or 
calling some employees “employee of the week.” 
We focus on the case where this good is com-
pletely free from the principal’s point of view.
We denote the award of a discrete positional 
good by h [ 50, 6 and suppose that this good 
generates utility of h 1eˆ 2	where eˆ is the fraction 
of workers in the organization who are awarded 
the positional good. Assume that h9 1eˆ 2 , 0 and 
h 1eˆ 2 5 0 for eˆ $ e– where e– # . This says that 
there is a crowding effect—if everyone gets the 
positional good, then its value goes to zero.
We assume that granting the honor is part of 
an implicit contract and could, in principle, be 
conditioned on p rather than just s. However, 
it has to be incentive compatible for the prin-
cipal to award the positional good to everyone 
who produces p after output is realized. This 
is where the fact that the positional good has a 
zero marginal cost plays a key role and differs 
from monetary incentives. The principal is actu-
ally indifferent about awarding the positional 
good to anyone, so it is weakly optimal for him 
to commit to a rule h 1p2 5  and h 102 5 0, i.e., 
status is conferred only on those who produce 
high output. This is an important feature of 
purely nominal rewards, which we record as:
PROPOSITIOn 2: Even though the principal’s 
payoff is not verifiable, it is incentive compatible 
for the principal to award the positional good to 
every agent who produces high output.
 It is possible to provide more explicit micro-foundations 
for this preference. Consider, for example, a simple career-
concerns setting. Suppose that there are high-ability types 
in the population who always produce high output and a 
fraction a of the agents is of that kind. Status (and possibly 
future rewards) come from being this type. Then, with com-
mon effort level eˆ among the low ability agents, the prob-
ability that the agent is good conditional on having received 
the award is a/ 1a 1 1 2 a 2 eˆ 2 , which is decreasing in eˆ. 
Of course, the case where the positional good 
is costless is the extreme case, but there is a 
 difference between rewards that exploit status 
from those that require money (as in a dynamic 
model along the lines of Baker, Gibbons, and 
Murphy 99) since it will generally require less 
stringent reputational enforcement in a dynamic 
setting.
We now consider how awarding positional 
goods to all agents who produce p affects the 
choice of monetary incentives. To get a simple 
closed-form solution, suppose that
 u 2 leˆ if eˆ # u/l
 h 1eˆ 2	5 •	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 .
 0 otherwise
Thus, e– 5 u/l is the fraction of agents produc-
ing high effort above which the value of status 
goes to zero.5
In this case, organizational effort (in a nash 
equilibrium) will be
 eˆ 5 
u 1 D 3b 11 2 2 b 10 2 4
c 1 l ,
which we assume is less than u/l. Repeating the 
logic that lead to Proposition , we now have:
PROPOSITIOn : the optimal contract sets 
b 10 2 5 0 and
 b 12 5 max e0, 1p 2 u 2  D 2 g 10 2 1c 1 l 22D2 f .
the corresponding effort level is
 e 5 
u 1 Db 11 2
c 1 l .
It is clear, upon inspection, that b 12 is lower 
compared to the previous case. The condition 
for e to be lower in this case is D/c , u/l, which 
holds given our assumption above that eˆ , u/l, 
together with the fact that b 12 , 1p 2 c 2/2D.
This result gives a clear idea of how adding 
status incentives has an impact on the choice of 
monetary compensation. They relax monetary 
5 One possible interpretation of this formulation is as 
follows. Suppose that u 5 l. Then 1 2 eˆ 2 is the percentage 
of workers who do not succeed, and hence the size of group 
to whom the successful group feels superior.
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incentives in two distinct ways. First, there is a 
direct effect due to the fact that status incentives 
create motivated agents in the sense of Besley and 
Ghatak (2005). Second, there is an indirect effect 
due to crowding whereby increasing monetary 
rewards reduce the value of status and hence 
reduce the principal’s use of monetary incentives.
We will now see a bonus being offered when 
s 5  if, and only if,
 
p 2 u
c 1 l  $ 
g 10 2
D
.
The condition for the use of incentive pay to be 
optimal for the principal is more stringent than 
in the absence of status incentives. Intuitively, 
incentive pay is costly while status is costless 
from the principal’s point of view.
What is the incentive of the firm to use status 
incentives? We show that firms that use status 
incentives will have higher payoffs, other things 
being equal. The expected payoff of the princi-
pal from a single agent, in the case of an interior 
solution, is
 P 5 p0 1 ep 2 Deb 12 2 g 102b 12 .
As b 12 5 3 1c 1 l 2 e 2 u 4/D, this can be viewed 
as a function of e. Since the principal can be 
viewed as “choosing” e via b 12 by the envelope 
theorem, only the direct effect of u needs to be 
considered. This turns out to be
()  
'P
'u
 5 e 1 
g 10 2
D
 . 0.
That is, the principal always benefits from 
having a status-motivated agent, and since cre-
ating status incentives is costless in our frame-
work, will always do so. The intuition is simple: 
anything that raises effort for “free” will raise 
expected profits.
III.  Implications
Our model has implications for the balance 
of monetary and status incentives that we are 
likely to see an organization use. Even though 
an organization faces no variable cost in creating 
 status incentives, suppose that it bears a fixed 
cost in setting up such a system of rewards. We 
are interested in understanding which firms will 
make use of such incentives.
Differentiating () yields
 
'2P
'u'p
 5 
1
2 1c 1 l 2  . 0.
Hence, firms with higher returns from high out-
put will tend to benefit most from introducing 
status incentives. To see this, observe that how 
much expected profits go up when u increases 
depends on e which is increasing in p.
The model also predicts that the case for 
status incentives is stronger the more severe is 
the problem of measuring p. To see this most 
clearly, we normalize g 12 1 g 102 5  and let 
q ; g 102 5  2 g 12 . The higher is q, the less 
informative is s as a measure of high output. 
now it is straightforward to show that
 
'2P
'u'q  5 
1
2 11 2 2q 2 2  . 0.
To understand this, note that an increase in 
u raises expected profits via two channels. 
First, it raises effort for a given bonus level. 
Second, it enables the firm to reduce the 
bonus. Bonuses are a costly and inefficient 
instrument to elicit effort when the signal of 
output is noisy. As a result, if q goes up, even 
though the first source of the gain is smaller, 
the second source of the gain is large and the 
net effect is to raise the marginal gain from 
having motivated workers.
We record these facts as:
PROPOSITIOn : All firms gain from using 
status incentives, but the gains are higher for 
firms where output is harder to verify and the 
return to higher output is greater.
The finding that status incentives are incen-
tive compatible hinges on there being no possi-
bility of agents bribing the principal to receive 
a status reward. Since such rewards can be cre-
ated for free and they are valuable to agents, 
there is the possibility of corruption within in 
the organization, which would undermine the 
success of these rewards, since in the limit they 
will be sold by the principal to a point where 
h 1e 2 5 0. This explains why, in practice, orga-
nizations that use status incentives may go to 
pains to point out that they are given out only 
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to the deserving, and that there is no market in 
such rewards.
Status incentives work by creating social divi-
sions. So far, we have assumed that they raise 
the utility of the winner while having no impact 
on the utility of those who are not awarded 
them. But this need not be the case. It could even 
be true that the disutility from the shame that 
accrues from not receiving a positional good 
outweighs the utility from the honor among 
those who receive it.7 This creates a potential 
cost to the principal of introducing status incen-
tives. In the current setting, however, where the 
agent gets a rent from working for the principal, 
this cost is not internalized by the principal.8 So 
status incentives could be introduced even in sit-
uations where the welfare of agents goes down.
To illustrate this formally, for simplicity, sup-
pose that g 12 5 , g 102 5 0, and l 5 0. Suppose 
that status yields utility u– and failure to achieve 
status yields 2u–. now, eˆ 5 1p 1 u– 1 u– 2 /2c 
and b 12 5 3p 2 1u– 1 u–2 4/29. It is straightfor-
ward to show that introducing a status reward 
raises agent utility if, and only if,
 
1
8  1p 1 u– 1 u–22 2 18 p2 . c u–.
This can never hold if u– 5 u– 5 u, i.e., when the 
disutility of low status exactly offsets the utility of 
gaining status.0 The intuition is simple. Suppose 
we set u– 5 0 and consider a small increase in 
u– starting from 0. By the envelope theorem, the 
effect via e can be ignored. However, the bonus 
will go down and, in addition, there is a first-
order negative effect on the agent’s utility condi-
tional on failure. As a result, he is worse off. In 
 The creation of honor from a status reward also comes 
from a general perception that those who receive the reward 
have produced high output. This would be the case we have 
assumed where p is observable, but not verifiable. However, 
it would be interesting to explore the role of status rewards 
where whether an agent has produced p is not observed by 
everyone in the organization.
7 Of course, the same could also be true of regular 
incentive pay. However, for positional goods, as opposed to 
money, this effect seems more plausible.
8 This would not be the case if the outside option con-
straint was binding.
9 This assumes that p . u–
 
1 u–.0 To see this, observe that this condition reduces to 1p 1 u 2/2c . , which contradicts the requirement that eˆ 
5 1p 1 2u 2/2c , . 
contrast, if u– goes up from 0, by a similar logic 
the bonus will go down, but this will be domi-
nated by the first-order effect of the utility con-
ditional of success. naturally, the higher is u– the 
more likely the agent is worse off.
IV.  Concluding Comments
This paper has studied the role of status 
 incentives by firms to increase effort. In future
work it would be interesting to look at broader 
aspects of status incentives, especially the con-
trast between those created within firms with 
those creating outside firms (such as national 
honors systems and professional honors).
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